We treat government concessions as additions to an expected payoffs schedule rather than as being synonymous with it. Government concessions that add to terrorists' expected payoffs past some point on a positively sloped risk-reward trade-off schedule will not make all terrorists more risk seeking. Such concessions do not represent certain 'windfall gains' to terrorists of the kind that interact with relative and absolute risk aversion. Although the expected payoffs to higher risk actions may be augmented by the government's concessions, terrorists must still bear risk in order to attain them. Terrorist groups that were unwilling to bear that risk before will not be enticed to bear it after expected payoffs are enhanced. Conversely, negative concessions or penalties will make terrorists more averse to risk because penalties alter the risk-reward trade-off in ways that make lower-risk actions more desirable to risk-averse terrorists. Our paper also explores the risk-reward characteristics of new and innovative terrorist actions relative to the structure of an existing expected payoffs schedule.
Introduction
In a grainy black and white photograph taken in early 1975, a weary man stares obediently into the camera. The sign he is holding says in block capital lettering, "PETER LORENZ-GEFANGENER DER BEWEGUNG 2. JUNI." (Note 1) Peter Lorenz was a German politician and mayoral candidate for West Berlin. He was kidnapped by the 2 nd of June Movement a few days before the mayoral elections in February 1975. After five days, the German government agreed to grant several concessions to the terrorists on the condition that Lorenz be released unharmed. These concessions included the release of 5 prisoners, transport to Yemen, about 100,000 Deutschmark in cash and media coverage of the departing 707 from Frankfurt airport (Winkler, 2008, p.246) . Upon receipt of these concessions, Lorenz was released. The conventional wisdom that terrorists should never be negotiated with was disregarded. It would, however, be reinstated in just a matter of weeks as the German government confronted another set of terrorist demands, this time from the Red Army Faction (RAF) who were holding twelve hostages in the German embassy in Stockholm.
conventional wisdom that concessions make terrorists more likely to engage in terrorist activity and, perhaps, to engage in riskier acts of terrorism.
The optimality of the 'never negotiate' policy was subjected to theoretical scrutiny by Lapan and Sandler (1988) but the analysis did not treat risk preferences explicitly. It is not uncommon for analytical work to leave risk preferences implicit and where risk preferences have been incorporated into the analysis, it has been usual to specify a particular type or level of risk preference, hold that specification constant, and explore the impact of government concessions in a comparative statics framework. Sandler, Tschirhart and Cauley's (1983) analysis is an example (Note 2). These economic studies focus on hostage-taking or kidnapping scenarios where terrorists attempt to bargain with the government in order to extract concessions. The examples with which we opened the paper are typical. Risk preferences have been treated in a similar manner in the international relations literature where the focus has been on inter-group or international conflict. Risk preferences are specified and the solution, if any, to the bargaining problem is determined within the boundaries of that specification. An example is Powell's (2002) analysis which represents an assessment of Rubinstein's (1982) 'standard model' under conditions of risk neutrality. Powell's analysis applies to scenarios where a 'bargaining surplus' may be divided in different proportions between the 'players'.
Analytical solutions to a number of the problems that are explored in this and related literature are often more easily attainable when risk preferences are left to one side or where risk neutrality is assumed. This leaves open the possibility for obtaining additional results by exploring what happens when risk preferences are specified in different ways. Skaperdas (2006) operates first under the assumption of risk neutrality before exploring the implications of risk aversion. Related concepts that emerged with the publication and dissemination of Kahneman and Tversky's (1979; 1992) presentation of prospect theory, especially their concept of loss aversion, have been inserted into bargaining theory. Butler (2007) is representative of modern studies that explore the implications of different psychological and strategic aspects of bargaining, including different treatments of risk preferences, in scenarios previously explored with less nuanced specifications of attitudes towards the risk and potential losses and potential gains. Butler (2007) , for example, finds important qualifications to the types of conclusions that might be reached by approaching bargaining problems from an expected value maximisation perspective- Fearon's (1995) model, for instance-rather than a prospect theoretical perspective (Note 3).
We are focused on the following problem. Can government concessions or penalties shape terrorists' preferences for risk? (Note 4) The setting for this problem is broader than the bargaining scenarios analysed in the papers listed above. The setting is a terrorism context where there are expected payoffs to terrorist actions, which include assassination, hijacking, bombing, hostage-taking and armed assaults. What these expected payoffs may be is still a matter for debate but they may include some or all of the following: the infliction of fatalities, the garnering of media coverage, the fostering of grassroots support, the formation of strategic links with other like-minded terrorist groups and so on (Abrahms 2006; 2008; 2011) . We do not treat the concessions-ransoms, release of prisoners, changes of government policy and so forth-that might come from the government in response to an act of terrorism as the payoffs to terrorism. Rather, the government's concessions or penalties schedule adds to or alters but does not replace an underlying expected payoffs schedule that is characterised by a particular trade-off between risk and reward.
The paper attempts to bring terrorism researchers' attention to theoretical advances in parts of the economics literature that might otherwise go unnoticed. The distinguishing feature of the paper is its treatment of risk preferences as being shaped by the government's decisions regarding concessions and penalties rather than, as has been traditional, exploring the impact of different decisions under different specifications of terrorists' preferences for risk. We avoid treating concessions as being the payoff to the terrorism because Ross (2004, p. 216) has shown that replacing an entire incentives or payoffs schedule with a compensation or concessions schedule leads to theoretical results that are difficult to interpret in real-world settings. To clearly distinguish between total expected payoffs and concessions that represent additions or alterations to those payoffs, the theoretical apparatus that we apply to the analysis of the effect of government concessions and penalties on terrorists' risk preferences sets the expected payoffs schedule and concessions schedule side-by-side such that the effect of concessions on expected payoffs is clearly delineated. Terrorists' choices of actions on the basis of the risks and rewards reflected in the expected payoffs schedule can then be examined to determine whether the alteration of the risk-reward trade-off inherent in the expected payoffs schedule can be expected to influence terrorists' decisions regarding the amount of risk they are willing to bear.
The Shape of Payoffs, Concessions and Penalties
Terrorists confront an expected payoffs schedule characterised by some, presumably positive, trade-off between risk and reward. Powell (2002) utilises a purely theoretical risk-reward trade-off. Phillips (2009) treats inflicted human tragedy measured by injuries and fatalities as the payoff to terrorism and sees a positive trade-off between risk and reward emerging empirically from the RAND-MIPT data as a concave set in expected-payoff-risk space. In dealing with bargaining scenarios it is easy to confuse a total payoffs schedule with the government's concessions schedule. The two will only be synonymous if concessions are the only relevant payoffs to a terrorist action. Usually, though, there will be some payoffs that lie outside of the government's control or its policy-making regimes. As mentioned in the introduction, these could be one or a combination of many different factors and some of them might be intangible or psychic in nature. A government's concessions schedule may alter or add to the existing expected payoffs schedule but it is not synonymous with it and does not replace it.
A payoffs schedule that incorporates all of the payoffs to terrorism, assuming they can all be measured (Note 5), would be multi-dimensional. We can imagine, however, that the payoffs schedule will be positively inclined in risk-reward space in order to encompass the positive trade-off between risk and reward that confronts terrorists. As Phillips (2009) has shown, different types of terrorist actions can be combined. When risk is measured by standard deviation or variance and the payoffs to each type of action are imperfectly correlated, a positively inclined and concave payoffs schedule emerges in risk-reward space. It is positively inclined because terrorist actions with a higher average payoff are attended by a higher risk or variance of their outcomes. It is concave because imperfect correlation between the payoffs to the different types of terrorism-payoffs to different actions do not move perfectly together over time-introduces concavity as an important aspect of the statistical structure. Only perfectly correlated payoffs across terrorist actions will produce a linear risk-reward trade-off. This concave trade-off between risk and reward that emerges when average payoffs and variance are considered in a context where terrorist actions can be combined is the clearest picture available of the type of statistical properties that may characterise the terrorists' total or overall payoffs schedule.
We could examine a basic but unrealistic situation where a government's 'schedule of concessions' replaces or becomes synonymous with the total payoffs schedule. However, unless we are willing to assume that concessions from the government are the only payoffs to terrorism this approach would lead us into the difficulties identified by Ross (2004, p.216) . Even if we could make such an assumption the resulting analysis would, at best, apply only to a very small number of terrorist actions. The problem of government concessions in a terrorism context must be approached by treating the government's concessions schedule as something that alters or adds to the payoffs schedule but does not replace it. If the payoffs schedule is characterised by a particular trade-off between risk and reward an alteration of or addition to the payoffs schedule may change this risk-reward trade-off. It is possible that the alteration or addition could increase the payoffs to risky terrorist actions. However, this is different from making those riskier actions more desirable from a terrorist's point of view. Only if the concessions schedule alters the terrorists' risk preferences in a manner that makes them more risk seeking will riskier actions-even those attended by higher payoffs than before-be desired by terrorists.
If a payoffs schedule to terrorism might be conceived of as depicting a trade-off between risk and reward that is positively inclined and probably concave, the concessions and penalties that might be expected to characterise the government's strategy or policy towards terrorists must also be shaped in some way. The 'shape' of the government's concessions schedule is important. Recent work in other parts of economics, especially the analyses prepared by Carpenter (2000) and Ross (2004) , has focused on the convexity and concavity of 'incentives schedules'. The problem addressed in the literature that encompasses agency theory and theoretical finance theory or financial economics is analogous to ours. Their problem is to alter or add to a total remuneration schedule with an incentives schedule in order to entice the individual being remunerated to take more or less risk. The language used in this contemporary literature speaks of convexifying or concavifying a utility function. A schedule that convexifies a utility function makes the individual more risk seeking. A schedule that concavifies a utility function makes the individual more averse to risk. The 'folklore', as Ross (2004) calls it, in financial economics and agency theory had been that a convex schedule convexifies a utility function while a concave schedule concavifies it. The shape, convex or concave, of the government's concessions schedule is central to our problem.
A convex schedule of concessions is one that will magnify the payoffs to terrorism past some point. The reason why this might be thought to decrease terrorists' aversion to risk and make them more risk seeking is that the effect of such a concession is to 'steepen' past some level of risk the positively inclined risk-reward trade-off characterising the expected payoffs schedule. Past some point of either payoff or risk, depending on how one The analytical treatment of concessions within the terrorism studies literature is quite advanced but relevant results can be found in a research program that is ongoing in other parts of economics. Both Ross (2004) and Carpenter (2000) make some progress in identifying the conditions under which a convex schedule will convexify an agent's utility function. The type of problem that Ross and Carpenter address is a part of the research program directed towards the investigation of the principal-agent problem. In turn, parts of this research program fall under the broader research program that investigates the role of incentives in economic decision-making and risk taking (Note 11). This literature has received an additional boost following the financial crisis of 2008 where excessive risk taking and misaligned incentives figured prominently in the analytical post-mortems carried out over the ensuing several years (Note 12). The number of theoretical advances since Ross (2004) has not been substantial and his paper remains among the few to rigorously address the problem of whether convex schedules convexify an agent's utility function (Note 13).
Granting concessions may not be a sub-optimal negotiation strategy but will granting concessions make terrorists more risk seeking? Will granting concessions that increase the expected payoffs to more risky terrorist actions entice terrorists to engage in those actions? We have addressed this question in this paper. Convex positively valued concessions that increase the expected payoffs to risky terrorist actions will not make 'terrorists' as a general category more risk seeking. This result emerges clearly when the concessions schedule is treated as being distinct from the expected payoffs schedule. Existing theoretical work has often focussed on exploring decision-making within scenarios where the concessions that may be received from the government are the terrorists' payoffs. Our treatment, by contrast, sets down an expected payoffs schedule that is altered by the imposition of positive or negative government concessions. Expected payoffs are risky and the actual outcomes of a terrorist action may diverge from those that were expected. Linked as they are in our analysis to the payoffs to risk actions, positive concessions are also risky and uncertain. Although they may increase the expected payoffs to more risky terrorist actions, positive concessions do not represent additions to the terrorists' accumulated payoffs, resources or 'wealth'. The expected payoffs schedule is altered but not in a manner that entices the utility maximising risk averse terrorist to engage in riskier actions.
